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Abstract 
The upsurge of Chinese and Indian outward foreign direct investment (FDI) raises an 
unanswered question about locational determinants of direct investment from the two 
countries. Using an unbalanced bilateral FDI database, we find that Chinese and Indian 
FDI are attracted to countries with large market size, low GDP growth, high volumes of 
imports from China or India, and low corporate tax rates. We also find important 
differences between China and India. While Chinese FDI is drawn to countries with open 
economic regimes, depreciated host currencies, better institutional environments, and 
English speaking status, none of these factors are important for Indian FDI. Chinese FDI 
is also deterred by geographic distance and OCED membership. However, neither of 
these has any impact on Indian FDI.  
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A Panel Data Analysis of Locational Determinants of  
Chinese and Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The rise of China and India is one of the defining events of the 20
th
 century. While China 
has captured the world‟s attention by its phenomenal FDI inflows and impressive GDP 
growth, India is swiftly developing its offshore IT outsourcing and other service sectors 
with its language and institutional advantages. The sheer size of the two countries, along 
with their rapid growth, means that some of the most important impacts are likely yet to 
be seen. With significant deregulation within the two countries on FDI abroad, those 
companies that have gained more confidence and accumulated more financial capital are 
now spreading their wings and investing overseas. Table 1 shows that from 1982 to 1992, 
Chinese FDI rose from 44 US$ million to 4000 US$ million, while India‟s outward FDI, 
beginning at only 1 US$ million in 1982, rising rose slowly to 24 US$ million in 1992 
and then grew steadily from 82 to 2222 US$ million in 2004. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The upsurge of Chinese and Indian FDI raises an unanswered question about the 
locational determinants of direct investment from the two countries. It is important to 
pursue such an understanding for several reasons. First, FDI from developing countries, 
especially big economies such as China and India, becomes a new source, alongside FDI 
from developed nations. MNEs from developing countries may foster positive spillovers 
because of narrower technological gaps between them and firms in developing nations 
(Battat and Aykut 2005). They are less corporatised and more informal than western 
models, and are often more appropriate to the host country context (Gelb 2005). In the 
light of significant decline in investments from developed nations, FDI from developing 
countries plays an important role in sustaining FDI flows to developing nations. Host 
country governments and agencies have an incentive to learn what attracts this type of 
investment in order to design their investment promotion policies. Furthermore, their 
investments may or may not have different determinants vis-à-vis FDI originating in 
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developed nations. A systematic investigation will give us empirical evidence to take part 
in this debate. Third, a comparative study will enable us to explore whether Chinese and 
Indian FDI react to host characteristics differently and why they do so.  
Using unbalanced panel data, we find that Chinese and Indian FDI are attracted to 
countries with large market size, low GDP growth, high volumes of imports from China 
or India, and low corporate tax rates. We also find important differences between China 
and India. While Chinese FDI is drawn to countries with open economic regimes, 
depreciated host currencies, better institutional environments, and English speaking 
status, but deterred by geographic distance and OCED membership; none of these factors 
is important for Indian FDI. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on the 
locational determinants of FDI and studies on FDI from developing countries. Section 3 
presents our research hypotheses. Section 4 explains the data, measurements and 
methodology. Section 5 reports the results. Finally, we summarise our findings, discuss 
policy implications, and acknowledge the limitations of the study.   
2. Literature review  
2.1. Locational determinants of FDI  
As an important component of globalisation, FDI has grown far more rapidly than 
international trade during the last two decades (Gaston and Nelson 2002). Accordingly, 
there has been a vast amount of empirical literature developed around the issue of the 
forces attracting FDI. The literature is not only massive but also „chaotic‟ (Chakrabarti 
2001) because it has not been possible to arrange location-specific decisions of 
companies into a uniform theoretical pattern (Baniak et al 2003). However, according to 
Dunning‟s (1993) categorisation, most FDI can be classified into three types: resource-
seeking, efficiency-seeking and market–seeking. As a result, most previous empirical 
studies have investigated the impact of the availability of natural resources, typically 
minerals, raw materials and agricultural products; the costs and quality of particular 
factor endowments; and the size and growth of domestic markets. Recently, scholars 
contend that FDI is also subject to basic macroeconomic trends, which bring some „less 
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conventional‟ variables, such as exchange rates, inflation rates, and debt levels, into the 
general framework. In addition, Dunning (2006) stressed the importance of the host 
institutional environment, such as taxes and fiscal incentive structure and legal and 
macroeconomic infrastructure, to inbound FDI.  
 
While most empirical studies included „conventional‟ variables, the inclusion of „less 
conventional‟ ones differs from one to the other depending on the specific focus of the 
research. For example, Clegg and Scott-Green (1999) investigated the determinants of US 
and Japanese FDI into the European Community (EC) 1984-89 and found that the effects 
of conventional host characteristic variables demonstrated considerable varieties between 
groups of member countries. For example, throughout those countries in the EC with low 
labour costs, higher labour costs are positively associated with US and Japanese FDI; yet 
in countries with high labour costs, this effect diminishes. Both US and Japanese FDI 
react strongly to the market size of new entrants to the EC, but less so for existent EC 
member countries. Japanese FDI reacts more strongly to the EU integration compared to 
the US FDI due to its less established position in the EU. Corporate tax levels are less 
important in explaining FDI flows into the EC from outside. Focusing on the annual 
bilateral flows of FDI in the EU-15 members, Janicki et al. (2005) found the host market 
size and relative size of the two economies significantly increase FDI flows, and distance 
significantly reduces FDI flows. European convergence variables, such as equalisation of 
financing costs, convergence of government fiscal policy and the similarity of 
government debt, all increase bilateral FDI flows. In contrast, low labour cost is not an 
attractive factor of the EU FDI.  
 
Biswas (2002) also found that low wage is not a significant factor in attracting US MNEs, 
using FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from forty-four countries 
during the period 1983-1990. Instead, many institutional factors, such as the regime type 
of the host country, regime duration and property rights index, are significant, suggesting 
the importance of a healthy institutional environment in attracting US FDI. Sethi et al. 
(2003) studied the changing trends in the US FDI into the Western European and Asian 
regions over the period 1981-2000. During 1981-1982, their results show that US FDI has 
gone to Western Europe because of its high political and economic stability and high 
 5 
GNP. Cultural proximity to the USA is a strong determinant, with cultural distance being 
negative and highly significant. However, the data between 1981 and 2000 show that US 
FDI was attracted by low GNP countries and that the negative impact of cultural distance 
on US FDI diminished. This historical pattern indicates that once US MNEs confronted 
the declining profits in Western Europe, the resulting cost reduction pressures impelled 
them to start making much more efficiency-seeking FDI into Asia, although Asian 
countries do not provide the best mix of the traditional determinants of FDI. Moreover, 
the high-wage differential between West Europe and Asia is the most significant factor 
contributing to the restructure of US FDI during 1981-2000, suggesting that low labour 
costs do matter, but only in the long-term and within countries with heterogeneous labor 
costs or quality. 
 
As a result of the transition of several Central and Eastern European and the Chinese 
economies from communism to a market-based economic system, there has been growing 
attention paid to the impact of the country-specific risks and institutional and political 
environments on FDI inflows. Bevan and Estrin (2004) reported that, based on a panel 
data of bilateral flows of FDI from Western countries in eleven Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, key announcements on progress in EU accession had a 
significant and positive impact on FDI inflows, but FDI flows to transition economies are 
not influenced significantly by market evaluations of country-specific risk. Brada et al. 
(2006) investigated the impact of political factors on FDI flows into seven transition 
economies in Europe from 1993 to 2001. They found that the initial cumulative inflation 
rate, the cumulative GDP decline, the share of the private sector in GDP, and change in 
the unemployment rate significantly reduced FDI inflows. The index of infrastructure 
reform of a country, lending minus deposits, and change in current account (percentage of 
GDP) increased FDI inflows, and therefore confirmed the benefits resulting from reform 
policies.  
 
Egger and Winner (2006) studied the impact of corruption in a panel of bilateral outward 
FDI stocks of twenty-one OECD countries in fifty-nine OECD economies between 1983 
and 1999. They found a negative impact of corruption on FDI. In addition, corruption is 
important for intra-OECD FDI but not for extra-OECD FDI and overall the impact of 
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corruption has declined over years, suggesting that other factors have become relatively 
more important than corruption. Similarly, Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) used the index 
of corruption based on Davoodi and Tanzi (1997) to indicate the level of institutional 
inefficiency in ninety-seven countries from 1990 to 1999 and found it significantly 
negatively related to the ratio of inward FDI to gross fixed capital formation, confirming 
their hypothesis that MNEs are more sensitive to institutional inefficiency in the host 
country than domestic firms. Similarly, despite the overall phenomenal FDI into China, 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2004) found that from 1986 to 2002 the political deficiency and 
potential risks of China have showed statistically negative impacts on investors‟ decisions 
on entering China.  
 
2.2. FDI from developing countries 
 
FDI from developing nations is still in its infancy but has become increasingly important 
(WIR, 2006). Most FDI from developing countries goes to other developing countries 
and is called south-south FDI (Aykut and Ratha 2004; Gelb 2005). Market-access and 
resource-access are the most important drivers of south-south FDI. Another noteworthy 
phenomenon is that many developing countries are aggressively engaged in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions as a strategy to enter overseas markets. However, due to its 
relatively new prevalence and limited data availability, there is a lack of systematic study 
on the determinants of FDI from developing countries. Wu and Chen (2001) discussed 
China‟s outward FDI. They suggested in the 1980s, the majority of Chinese enterprises 
involved in transnational operations are state-owned enterprises, and the government 
maintains extensive controls over the market operations of these enterprises to serve its 
political and diplomatic motivations. However, since 1991 more and more national and 
regional business groups have begun to go overseas with trade and market related 
motivations. No statistical analysis is provided regarding the locational determinants of 
Chinese FDI in their research. Buckley et al. (2007) provided one of the first statistical 
attempts to analyse the determinants of Chinese outward FDI. The most important 
contribution of the research is that it shows determinants of Chinese FDI vary over 
different time periods. For example, while political risk (lower risk scores) of the host 
country is found to be positively related to Chinese investment flows between 1982 and 
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1991, this result disappears in the time period of 1992 to 2001. The impact of geographic 
proximity to China is significant and negative for the period between 1984 and 1991, but 
not for the period of 1992 to 2001. They also found that Chinese FDI is attracted by 
market size of OECD countries, but attracted to non-OECD countries which have strong 
trade relations with China.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
Since the empirical literature has suggested that FDI responds to a wide rage of stimuli, 
we decide to include the most widely acknowledged factors in our investigation to keep 
the econometric analysis both manageable and representative. We present our hypotheses 
in this section with theoretical and/or empirical justification of their inclusion. Our first 
observation is the impact of market size. The reason for its inclusion is twofold. First, 
market access is the most widely acknowledged motivation of FDI, and empirically has 
obtained the most unanimous confirmation (Chakrabarti 2001). Secondly, anecdotal 
information has suggested that Chinese and Indian FDI is market motivated. For 
example, there has been excessive competition, thinning margins and overcapacity within 
many industries in China, which have spurred companies to invest abroad with a view to 
creating an overseas-based platform from which to gain access to local markets (Global 
Insight 2006). WIR (2006) suggested that one of the most important motivations for 
Indian MNEs is market access. As a result, we suggest:  
H1: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to host market size.  
 
Since we consider that Chinese and Indian FDI is market driven, market openness has to 
be considered alongside market size. Although the importance of market openness has 
been established based on empirical studies of developed economies, we suggest this is 
also relevant to Chinese and Indian FDI. Internationalization is a challenging process, full 
of risks and uncertainties. Cumbersome administrative process and unnecessary rigid 
regulations in the host country can make the process even more difficult. As such, MNEs, 
especially those from developing countries which lack international experience, will 
favour countries with open and friendly business environment. According to a recent 
survey conducted by Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2005), market related factors, 
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such as membership in a regional free trade, and use of target country as base for exports 
to third country, have been listed as driving forces of current Chinese FDI. UNCTAD 
(2004) also discussed the importance of accessible markets for Indian investors‟ location 
choice. It becomes clear that MNEs may engage into different types of cross-border 
activities to support and develop their global operations. Countries with many restrictions 
on these activities may cause for concern among multinationals and therefore reduce FDI 
inflows as a result. Market openness has been found to be important for FDI flows in 
numerous studies, such as Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Pistoresi (2000), Aizenman and 
Spiegel (2006) and Buch et al. (2005). As a result, we suggest, 
H2: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to the openness of the host country.  
 
The third area we examine is access to natural resources. This has been an important 
conventional factor explaining FDI. Moreover, China and India are the two biggest and 
fastest developing countries in the world; the need to secure access to overseas natural 
resources, such as energy and raw materials, is becoming increasingly important. Tan 
(1999) reported some cases of Chinese firms investing in Thailand for some location-
specific natural resources. The importance of accessing overseas natural resources has 
also attracted government attention in China. Lunding (2006) reported that the Chinese 
authorities have been aggressively courting the governments of host states by 
strengthening bilateral trade relations, awarding aid and providing much-needed transport 
and communications infrastructure to enable Chinese firms to access the strategically 
important raw materials. Securing natural resources is also becoming an important driver 
for Indian outward FDI (WIR 2006). We therefore suggest the following hypothesis: 
H3: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to the natural resource endowment of 
the host country.  
 
The relation between trade and FDI has received renewed attention (Blonigen 2001; 
2005). Replacing the traditional view that FDI and trade are substitutes, recent studies 
have revealed more complex relations. A prior trading relationship between a host 
country and an investing country can increase follow-up FDI. This is particularly relevant 
when multinationals want to serve the overseas market directly after previous exporting 
experience. In addition, FDI may reduce imports from a host country if it can result in the 
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securing of needed materials and production inputs directly. The complex relationships 
have been investigated in earlier studies, such as Fedderke and Romm (2006), Buckley et 
al. (2007), and Bevan and Estrin (2004). As such, we suggest,  
H4: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to trade relations with the host country.  
 
The exchange rate has a most important link with economic policy and international 
competitiveness, yet the effect of the exchange rate on FDI is one of the most 
controversial among the less conventional factors of FDI. Feenstra (1998) suggested that 
host currency appreciation reduces the wealth of foreign investors, and therefore will 
reduce investment. In contrast, host currency depreciation could not only attract more 
FDI directly by lowering asset prices, but also may gain more benefits to subsidiaries 
exporting from the host to overseas market. However, De Mello (1997) and Pain and 
Welsum (2003) argued that host currency appreciation may well stimulate inward 
investment that wishes to sell within host markets. Cushman (1984) suggested that host 
currency depreciation can make purchasing intermediate goods from a home country 
more expensive and subsequently reduce import-needed FDI. Theoretically, there are 
multiple channels wherein different impacts of exchange rates on FDI could take place, 
leaving no single prediction on FDI (Pain and Welsum 2003). Empirically, WIR (2006) 
has pointed out that the rise in its foreign currency reserves accelerated the growth of 
outward FDI from China, although there is a significant decline in the outward FDI 
conducted by Asian NIEs in 2005. While the Chinese RMB has been pegged to US 
dollars, it seems reasonable to expect that the exchange rate of host countries will have an 
impact on China‟s FDI flows. The possible positive link between an appreciating Chinese 
RMB (or depreciating host currency) and its outbound FDI could be well strengthened by 
the fact that a significant portion of Chinese FDI is government funded or assisted. For 
example, selected State owned enterprises (SOEs) and private owned enterprises (POEs) 
in China were given favourable financing in the form of credit lines, low interest loans, 
and foreign exchange (IBM Business Consulting 2006). It is likely that these privileged 
Chinese enterprises induce the government to rigorously employ the benign opportunity 
provided by a strong RMB, and therefore accelerate the positive connection between 
favourable exchange rates and their overseas investment.  
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Indian foreign exchange reserves have also been unprecedentedly high, reaching US$ 102 
billion in 2003, US$ 131 billion in 2004 and US$ 166 billion in 2005, as reported by the 
IMF. In fact, its exchange reserve has exceeded that of USA, France, Russia and 
Germany. The strong Rupee may encourage Indian firms to invest abroad because it 
increases their purchasing power. As such, the exchange rate should also be a matter to 
consider for Indian MNEs‟ overseas expansion; albeit the accelerating impact of 
government intervention may be absent. Therefore we suggest two hypotheses 
concerning the impact of exchange rate.  
H5a: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to host currency depreciation.  
H5b: The positive association of depreciating host currency (appreciating home currency) 
is stronger on China’s FDI than on India’s FDI.   
 
Recently, scholars have theoretically and empirically suggested that a wide range of host 
characteristics which reflect the „nature‟ of the host environment affect FDI. For example, 
Baniak et al. (2003) theoretically suggested there is an adverse selection effect from 
macroeconomic and institutional inefficiency of the host country, where investors aiming 
for the long-term development in the host country will be deterred, but those only for 
short-term rents from selling-buying assets are promoted. Alvaro (2006) found that 
corruption results in relatively lower FDI from countries that have signed the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
but relatively higher FDI from countries with high levels of corruption. Although there 
are certain institutional differences between China and India, it is suggested that their FDI 
would be negatively related to the host institutional inefficiency. As such, we propose:  
H6: China’s and India’s FDI is positively related to a better institutional environment of 
the host country. .  
 
Finally, the impact of geographical distance on FDI has been studied extensively in the 
empirical literature. The common view is that distance makes cross-border coordination 
expensive and therefore tends to reduce FDI. However, a positive effect might also exist 
if the FDI overcomes export costs. A significantly negative impact of distance is found in 
Aizenman and Spiegel (2006), Bevan and Estrin (2004), Buch et al. (2005), Janicki et al. 
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(2005) and Hsiao and Hsiao (2004). A negative yet insignificant impact appears in 
Buckley et al. (2007), Wei (2005) and Carr et al. (2001). In addition, earlier research by 
Gao (2005) found distance is a greater barrier to FDI from four Asian economies 
(Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand) compared to FDI from OECD countries. 
Since China has a strong cultural linkage with these countries, investors may have a 
similar reaction to distance and hence FDI from China may show similar pattern. India, 
although also an Asian country, has a rather distinctive cultural attribute.  Its century long 
colonization by the United Kingdom has greatly influenced its social, political and 
cultural system. So it might not share the attributes of the typical Asian countries in their 
outward investment. Hence, we propose:  
H7a: Distance is negatively related to China’s and India’s FDI. 
H7b: The negative impact of distance is stronger for China’s FDI than for India’s FDI.  
 
4. Data and variable measurement  
This section provides a discussion of measuring the dependent and independent variables 
as well as the data structure. 
 
4.1. Data 
The database comprises various sources. First, we include the top thirty destinations for 
Chinese (1999-2002) and Indian (2001-2004) FDI, derived from the UN database. To 
improve the year coverage, we amended our database by adding Chinese and Indian FDI 
into ASEAN countries (1995-2004), which is drawn from the ASEAN Statistics 
Yearbook 2005. China and India‟s FDI into Japan (1989-2005) and the United States 
(1980-2005) are derived from the Ministry of Finance of Japan and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), respectively. The dependent variable is the annual bilateral FDI flows 
from China and India to the sampled host countries. The nature of our panel data is 
unbalanced in the sense that from 1980 to 2005 some countries have full data (i.e., 26 
observations) and some have incomplete data (see Table 2 for sample composition). 
Additionally, we replaced the missing observations for some independent variables (i.e., 
LNEXPORT and variables related to legal environment) with their average values for the 
period. 
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(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
4.2. Dependent variable (FDI) 
The dependent variable is the aggregate annual flow of foreign direct investment 
(millions US$) by Chinese and Indian firms.  
 
4.3. Independent variables  
We measure market size by a few different indicators. The first (LNGDP) is the natural 
logarithm of GDP in billion US$. We also use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
(GDPPC) in 1000 US$, and GDP growth (GDPGW) as alternatives to indicate market 
size. The data are derived from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (April 
2005). For a host country‟s openness, we use two measures. The first is the natural 
logarithm of inward FDI stock (LNFDI-STOCK) in million US$, with Chinese and 
Indian FDI excluded to avoid bias. The second proxy is perhaps the most conventional 
one, namely, the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to the country‟s GDP 
(MX/GDP). It is acknowledged that openness is a multi-dimensional concept. We decide 
to use the two conventional measures to be consistent with the majority of existing 
studies. The data are derived from World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
UNCTAD‟s online FDI database.  
 
To proxy for the natural resources endowment of a country, we employ the percentage of 
ores and metals exports to total merchandise exports by country (RESOURCE), as 
reported by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators. Trade intensity is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of the value of a host country‟s exports to 
(LNEXPORT), and imports from (LNIMPORT), China and India respectively, expressed 
in historical million US dollars, as reported by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
in the China Statistical Yearbook and the Export and Import Bank of Indian Department 
of Commerce. It is noted that this variable differs from the second proxy of „openness‟ 
although both measurement involves trade. It is a pair-specific variable, whereas 
„openness‟ is a host country specific variable. Exchange rate (EXCHANGE) uses the first 
month‟s exchange rate of the local currency to US dollars for the year outward FDI is 
conducted. The data source is the IMF. We use bureaucracy quality, corruption and 
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political risk to indicate institutional inefficiency. The data are gathered from the 
International Country Risk Guide published by the PRS Group, a standard index used in 
this type of work. Bureaucracy quality index (BUREAU) is based on four points. High 
points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. The 
Corruption index (CORRUPTION) is based on six points, with higher scores indicating 
lower corruption. The Political Risk index (POLRISK) is based on 100 points, with 
higher scores indicating lower risk. Geographic distance is measured by the natural 
logarithm of air miles between the capital cities of China/India and the host country. 
 
4.4. Other variables  
We include three more variables to supplement the main model. The first is the inflation 
rate (INFLATION) of the host country. This variable can reflect the macroeconomic 
stability of the host environment. A more stable macroeconomic situation should 
encourage FDI, whereas a high inflation rate may reflect economic and financial 
instability in the host country and therefore deter FDI flows. It is also included in earlier 
empirical studies, such as Buckley et al. (2007). The annual inflation rate of the host 
country was obtained from the World Economic Outlook Database of the IMF. The 
second is the interest rate of the host country. It should be noted that one should avoid 
including both inflation and interest rate variables in the same model as they are generally 
alternatives to each other. The interest rate of the host country was obtained from the 
World Economic Outlook Database of the IMF. Finally, we also include corporate tax in 
the model. The importance of this factor is that it directly relates to the profitability of 
foreign direct investment. The orthodox assumption of profit maximisation leads us to 
propose that a high corporate tax rate would deter FDI, unless the motives of investors 
deviate from profit maximisation. Data on corporate tax rates is from the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies (Klemm, 2005).  It is noted that for all non-ratio variables (e.g. FDI, GDP) 
we used producer price index (PPI) to eliminate the impact of inflation. Hence the figures 
are in the base-year prices.  
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5. Results  
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for China (Panel A), for India (Panel B) and for 
the host countries (Panel C). On one hand, the value of standard deviation, kurtosis and 
skewness of China‟s FDI is systematically smaller than that of India. This implies that 
China‟s FDI has a more even distribution throughout the years than India‟s FDI. On the 
other hand, average Indian outward FDI is higher than China‟s outward FDI in the 
sample. The amount of exports from and imports to host countries is higher for China 
than to India. The mean and median of geographical distance for China‟s and India‟s 
panel are similar, but the standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness of India‟s sample is 
much smaller than that of China‟s panel. The remaining variables, namely bureaucratic 
quality, corruption, political risk and tax rate are highly similar for China and India‟s 
panels. However, the mean and median of interest rate and tax rate are higher for Chinese 
data than that of India‟s.  
 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the analysis. In Panel A 
(China), the variable of FDI has a significant correlation with bilateral trade between 
China and host countries, bureaucracy quality, corruption and political risk. Other 
variables also contain the correct signs, but without statistical significance. One exception 
to our expectations is GDP growth, which has a negative correlation with FDI. In Panel B 
(India), FDI has a significant correlation with the quality of bureaucracy and corporate 
tax rate of host countries, albeit the former has an unexpected positive correlation. The 
remaining variables all attain correct signs but again without statistical significance.  
 
5.3. Multivariate analysis 
5.3.1. Regressions using pooled data 
Table 5 reports the regression results for the pooled sample using fixed-effects estimates. 
We used the Hausman test to choose between random effects and fixed effects. In all 
cases (tables 5 and 6) and for the non-reported regression results, the Hausman p-values 
were lower than 0.05, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by 
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random effects are the same as the ones based on fixed effects method. We conclude that 
the correct estimation method is fixed effects. Furthermore, although the fixed effects 
method controls for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, it does not attempt to 
control for endogeneity. To partially account for this problem, we lagged by one period 
the apparently endogenous trade measures. We also dropped GDP per capita since it 
never attained significance in the preliminary analysis.  
The results show some sensitivity of the results according to different variables included. 
In Model 1, GDP obtained a statistically significant result with a positive sign, suggesting 
that both Chinese and Indian FDI are market seeking. This supports hypothesis 1. Market 
openness, as indicated by FDI stock, is also a positive and significant estimator. This 
suggests that Chinese and Indian FDI tend to be attracted to countries which have been 
generally open to inward FDI. Thus our second hypothesis is also supported. Resource 
intensity is not a significant factor. This finding contradicts our third hypothesis. This 
may be a consequence of the sample composition, since resource-rich countries, such as 
African countries, have a very limited presence in the sample. Alternatively, it may be 
that the resource-seeking is an industry specific attraction for FDI, but not so strongly as 
to affect aggregate FDI which contains a broad range of industries. Contrary to our fourth 
hypothesis, export between the host country and China/India is also an insignificant 
factor in Model 1. However, it is too early to judge that trade relations have nothing to do 
with FDI outflows from China and India since export is only one side of the coin. We 
will examine the impact of imports on FDI in model 5, allowing us to fully assess the 
impact of trade relations on FDI. Furthermore, exchange rates do not exert any significant 
role on outward FDI. This surprising result may reflect the mitigating effect of the 
„wealth effect‟ and „declining profit margin‟ effect of the exchange rate in this pooled 
sample.   
 
The coefficient on political risk is significantly positive, suggesting that the higher scores 
the host country has (the lower risk it is), the more FDI it attracts. This confirms our 
hypothesis that a sound institutional environment is conducive to international investment 
and therefore tends to attract more FDI from China and India. The coefficient on 
geographical distance is significantly negative, which indicates that outward FDI is 
deterred by geographical distance that makes cross-border coordination and monitoring 
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difficult. Hence, hypothesis 7a is supported. The association of inflation with outward 
FDI, on the other hand, is found statistically insignificant. However, the corporate tax rate 
carries a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting China‟s / India‟s FDI is deterred by 
high corporate tax.  
 
Finally, we examine the impacts of a few dummy and interactive variables. The 
significantly positive China dummy coefficient suggests that, controlling for a series of 
factors, outward Chinese FDI exceeds the Indian counterpart. Equally interesting, we find 
that the OECD dummy is significantly negative, suggesting overall FDI tends to decrease 
when the host country is an OECD member. The interactive effect of the exchange rate 
and the China dummy is insignificant, implying that Chinese outward FDI does not react 
to exchange rates differently compared to Indian FDI. However, the interaction between 
distance and the China dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level. This confirms 
our hypothesis that distance is a greater barrier to FDI from China, a similar impact 
experienced by other Asian countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
As an alternative indicator of institutional environment, we replace political risk with 
bureaucratic quality in Model 2. The model obtains results highly similar to those of 
Model 1, but bureaucratic quality does not reach statistical significance. The other 
difference between Models 1 and 2 is that we replaced inflation with the interest rate, 
which obtained qualitatively unchanged findings. Similarly, Model 3 produced similar 
results as those of Model 1, except that we replaced political risk with corruption. The 
significance of the corruption estimator is in line with our hypothesis (recall that higher 
scores of corruption indicate lower corruption levels). The findings based on alternative 
variables that proxy institutional environment support our hypothesis that both Chinese 
and Indian FDI are attracted to a sound host institutional environment. In Model 3, we 
also use an alternative openness measure, the sum of exports and imports of the host 
country divided by its GDP, and we find that the significance level of the openness 
coefficient improves to 1%. This result fortifies the notion that both China‟s and India‟s 
FDI are attracted by open economies.  
 
 17 
In Model 4, we test the alternative variable of market potential by replacing GDP with 
GDP growth. We find that growth rate negatively and significantly impacts outward FDI. 
This indicates that the Chinese and Indian FDI is demoted by rapid economic growth of 
the host country. One explanation of this apparently counter-intuitive result is that 
Chinese and Indian FDI is more attracted by established economies, which have passed 
the phase of rapid economic growth and may in some cases even experience a slight 
economic recession. In fact, a number of developed economics had experienced various 
degrees of recession between the 1990s and early 2000s, such as Japan (started early 
1990s and the recession is still ongoing), Australia, and Germany. Second, ASEAN 
countries constitute a significant part of our sample. But even the economic boom 
experienced by some ASEAN countries had ceased in 1997 due to the widespread Asian 
financial crisis. In addition, our result shares some resemblance with Nigh (1985) in 
which host GDP growth also has a negative, albeit weak, impact on FDI outflows from 
the United States.  
 
To focus on the inverse relation between outward FDI and GDP growth, we add an 
interaction variable of GDPGW*GROWTH DUMMY in Model 4, where Growth 
Dummy is 1 if GDP growth is negative (0 otherwise). The significantly positive 
coefficient on the interaction variable suggests that the negative relation between outward 
FDI and GDP growth becomes „less negative‟ when the GDP growth is negative. This is 
not only surprising but also it makes the reconciliation between the results of GDP 
growth and the corresponding interaction variable more difficult. This puzzling result 
may echo Chakrabarti‟s comment (2001) that GDP growth is one of the controversial 
variables in studying FDI. Indeed, previous studies have not reached conclusive result 
regarding the impact of GDP growth (Nigh 1985; Tsai 1994; Billington 1999).  
 
In Model 5, we replace exports with imports and find that, in contrast to exports, imports 
into the host country from China/India are an important estimator of FDI. This can be 
interpreted as both China‟s and India‟s FDI being motivated by further market 
establishment in the host country following up its exporting (to the host country, i.e. our 
import variable) activities. With accumulated learning experience from export, 
undertaking direct investment becomes an evolving strategy for Chinese and Indian firms 
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to further explore the overseas market. Hence, hypothesis 4 attains some empirical 
support. Finally, considering the data are unbalanced and there is no pre-1995 data except 
for the U.S., we dropped the US data in Model 6 to overcome the possibility that the US 
data may have biased our results. We obtained qualitative unchanged results in Model 6 
(except the tax variable), suggesting this is not a serious problem with the data.   
 
5.3.2. Regressions using data for each country 
Table 6 reports the separate regression results for China‟s and India‟s panel data, from 
which we observe important similarities and differences. We omitted a few variables, 
such as bureaucratic quality and corruption, because they attained less statistically 
satisfactory results than their alternatives.  
 
First, we find that GDP is a significant positive estimator of both China‟s and India‟s 
FDI. This suggests that FDI from the two countries is market seeking. However, the 
impact of host market size has a greater impact on China‟s FDI, as shown by the higher 
magnitude and statistical significance in China‟s case. Similar to the results in Table 5, 
GDP annual growth rate is found to be a significantly negative estimator of China‟s and 
India‟s FDI. The negative impact of GDP growth is even stronger in China‟s case.  
 
Market openness, measured by the sum of imports and exports divided by host country‟s 
GDP, achieves marginal significance in China‟s sample, except in Model 3, but no 
statistical significance in India‟s sample. This could be a consequence of the 
heterogeneous composition of China‟s and India‟s FDI. If the outward FDI is more 
vertical, then it tends to be more attracted by open trade regimes which facilitate import 
and export activities of FDI. In contrast, horizontal FDI aims for the host market, which 
renders it less important whether or not the host economy is open to international trade. 
As such, we conjecture that China‟s FDI could be more vertical, relative to the Indian 
case, and therefore is more attracted to open trade regimes. However, empirically 
differentiating vertical FDI from horizontal is difficult. The current practice (e.g. 
Aizenman and Marion 2004; Carr et al 2001) is to use local sales by foreign invested 
firms as the indicator of horizontal FDI and export as that of vertical FDI. We are not 
able to investigate them empirically because of data unavailability. 
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Resource intensity is found to be an insignificant factor with a counter-intuitive negative 
sign. As mentioned earlier, it may be that the resource-seeking is an industry specific 
attraction, but not so strong as to show up in aggregate FDI data which contains multiple 
industries.  
 
The host country‟s exports to China/India are not a significant variable. In contrast, the 
host country‟s imports from India are found to be positive and significantly related to 
India FDI, but this effect appears only in Model 3 for China‟s case. Taking the trade 
related factors collectively, we suggest that Indian FDI tends to flow to countries where 
India has had extensive export activities. Follow-up FDI may be used to further develop 
their establishment in the host market. But this impact is less significant for China‟s case. 
This may be because China‟s FDI is less horizontal than that of India. This is consistent 
with our conjecture concerning the result on market openness.  
 
Generally, the finding on India‟s FDI is in line with Vernon‟s (1966) argument that firms 
primarily produce in and export from the domestic market. Accumulated international 
experience through exporting and an increasingly saturated domestic market will 
motivate them to undertake FDI to explore and serve overseas markets directly.  
 
We find a contrasting result of the impact of the exchange rate on China‟s and India‟s 
FDI. While host country currency depreciation is found to carry a significant and positive 
sign on China‟s FDI, this is not the case for India‟s FDI. Two explanations may decipher 
this divergence. First, China‟s FDI is stimulated by the „wealth effect‟ brought about by 
the depreciated host currency, and is simply less concerned about the reduced profit 
margin associated with depreciated currency. India‟s sample suggests that the „wealth 
effect‟ and reduced profit margin effect may have offset each other and thus led to an 
insignificant result. This also hints that India‟s FDI may be more cautious and not 
attracted by short-term expansion, but rather long-term market viability. Second, a 
possible heterogeneous composition of Chinese and Indian FDI may have contributed to 
the result. We have already speculated that Chinese FDI is more vertical whereas Indian 
FDI is more horizontal. Vertical FDI will increase when the host currency depreciates 
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because it leads to a combined benefit of reduced initial investment costs and lower 
prices for export products. For horizontal FDI, although a depreciated host currency 
equally reduces initial investment costs, it will also bring down the profit margin. The 
statistical results do not fully confirm hypotheses 5a and 5b, but they do unveil a quite 
distinctive reaction of China‟s FDI to exchange rate.  
 
A recent publication studying Chinese, Indian and South African multinationals in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) finds evidence that lends some support to our interpretation 
(Henley et al 2008). For example, it is found that Chinese firms are expanding their 
operations very rapidly compared to their Indian peers, although they achieve much lower 
sales per employee. More interestingly, the research also discovers that Chinese firms are 
significantly more export-oriented than investors from India, and “even recently arrived 
Chinese firms are setting up export platforms in East Africa incentivized by third country 
trade regimes” (p.13). As such, we have more confidence in suggesting that both the 
vertical nature of Chinese FDI and government intervention have contributed to the 
impact of exchange rates on the location choices of Chinese investors. However, these 
two factors are absent in the Indian case.  
 
China‟s and India‟s samples also attained divergent results on political risk. In China‟s 
sample, political risk of the host country obtains a significantly positive result. Since high 
scores of political risk indicate low risk of the host country, this result reveals that 
China‟s FDI is attracted by countries with good institutional environment, thus 
confirming our hypothesis. However, this variable has no significant impact on India‟s 
FDI.  
 
We also found a divergent impact of geographical distance on China‟s and India‟s FDI. 
While it has a significantly negative impact on China‟s FDI, distance does not 
significantly influence outward Indian FDI. Our result is similar to those of Gao (2005) in 
which distance is found to be a greater barrier to FDI from four Asian economies 
(Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand) compared to FDI from OECD. This 
somewhat confirms our conjecture that China has an inherent cultural linkage with these 
four countries and that entrepreneurs in these countries share a similar mindset in their 
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going-global strategies. In contrast, India represents a distinctive culture from East Asia 
and thus does not share this feature. Theoretically, the impact of geographical distance is 
ambiguous in most FDI frameworks, such as the knowledge-capital model, where it is 
proposed to have a negative impact on vertical FDI, but less so on horizontal FDI. In 
more extreme cases, geographical distance could promote market-seeking FDI because 
FDI saves the transportation costs that exporters have to bear in serving an overseas 
market. As a result, the other causes for the contrasting impact of geographical distance 
on China‟s and India‟s FDI could be, again, the heterogeneous composition of their 
aggregated FDI.  
 
Inflation is found to be an insignificant factor for both China‟s and India‟s FDI. Another 
important finding of commonality between India and China is corporate taxation. We 
found that it has a significant and negative impact on Chinese and Indian FDI. This 
confirms our proposition that a host‟s high corporate taxation deters inward FDI.  
 
We also test whether English language proves attractive to Chinese and Indian FDI. We 
find that Chinese FDI is positively related to countries with English as official language. 
This probably indicates that Chinese investors pursue English-speaking countries because 
of their dominant position in the world economy. Information on these countries is 
abundant and easier to translate. In addition, many Asian countries (or regions) which 
have cultural linkage with China, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, use 
English as first or second official language. This could have increased the positive impact 
of English speaking on Chinese FDI. While this result is interesting but not counter-
intuitive, the insignificant result of this variable on Indian FDI is puzzling. One possible 
explanation is that although India is an English speaking country, it has a vast number of 
dialects. This could reduce the importance of English as an attractor to its investment. 
More importantly, its complex colony history by Western European countries, such as the 
Portuguese, Dutch, French, and Danish, apart from the UK, perhaps has enabled it to 
have close relations with some non-English speaking countries, thus reducing the 
dependence on English as communication language. 
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China continues its distinction from India in the OECD dummy variable, which is 
significantly negative for the former and insignificant for the latter. Since 28 out of 30 
OCED countries are from North America and Europe, this result suggests that China‟s 
FDI is constrained by its geographical scope, whereas India‟s is not. Finally, as in Table 
5, the interaction between growth rate and growth dummy has attained a statistically 
significant result for both China and India.  
 
Our results are in agreement with findings from a few previous studies, such as the 
impact of host GDP, resource endowment and inflation rate, in Buckley et al. (2007) and 
the divergent characteristics of Chinese FDI compared to that of Indian as shown in 
Henley et al. (2008). However, one striking difference between our results and those in 
Buckley et al. (2007) is that they concluded that Chinese FDI is attracted rather than 
deterred by political risk (p.513). However, this could be an imprecise interpretation on 
their part, because a closer look at the data in Buckley et al. (2007) shows that higher 
values indicate greater stability (hence lower risk). As a result, a significant and positive 
association between this variable and Chinese FDI, as shown in Table 6 (p. 512) of their 
paper, ought to be interpreted as suggesting that China‟s FDI is attracted to nations of 
higher political stability. If this is indeed a misinterpretation, then our result is consistent 
with theirs. Since, to our best knowledge, there is no statistical investigation of India‟s 
outbound FDI, we have little to compare for India‟s case. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
 
This study attempts to investigate the locational determinants of Chinese and Indian 
outward FDI. The traditional FDI framework has suggested a host of factors that are 
empirically and theoretically important in explaining the flows of FDI. We test the 
framework and find some important commonalities shared by the two countries. To be 
more specific, we found that Chinese and Indian FDI are attracted to countries with large 
market size, high volumes of import from China/India, and low corporate tax rates. The 
host country GDP growth is found to deter Chinese and Indian FDI. 
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China and India also demonstrate important differences in their FDI outflows. While 
Chinese FDI is promoted by open economic regimes, depreciated host currency, and 
better institutional environment, these factors are not important for Indian FDI. In 
addition, geographic distance significantly reduces Chinese FDI outflows but such effect 
is absent on Indian FDI. More interestingly, Chinese FDI is also drawn to English-
speaking countries but deterred by OECD membership, and yet none of these is important 
for Indian FDI.  
 
We discuss policy implications of our empirical results. First, the divergent result of 
exchange rate suggests that India‟s FDI aims for long-term profit viability, while China‟s 
FDI looks for rapid overseas expansion unless it is truly vertical weighted. Leveraging 
the advantage of a strong RMB is recommendable for vertical investment, but for non-
vertical FDI, caution is warranted because rapid international expansion and the long-
term profit viability need to be properly balanced to maximize the benefits and minimize 
the costs of internationalization. Second, regarding the negative impact of OECD and 
distance on China‟s FDI, it may take time for Chinese investors to be more comfortable 
with OECD countries and countries that are physically far away from China. However, 
these countries have to be taken into account if Chinese investors want to have a truly 
international presence. Third, the non-significant impact of political risk on Indian FDI is 
rather unusual. It seems that a combination of historical, cultural and political reasons 
may have driven this result. Unless Indian FDI has competitive advantage in mitigating 
negative impact of political risk, caution needs to be taken in estimating their ability to 
cope with inefficient institutional systems. This is particularly imperative for 
multinationals aiming for emerging markets.  
 
One interesting finding of our research is on GDP growth. FDI from China and India 
reacts negatively to GDP growth, making it rather counter-cyclical. Hence, it can 
contribute to macroeconomic stabilization in the host country. Another relevant issue 
may be the composition of China‟s and India‟s FDI. Some factors (e.g. exchange rate and 
distance) indicate that China‟s FDI is more likely to be vertically weighted. While there is 
no clear-cut argument of which type of FDI is superior, it is a consensus that vertical FDI 
is more footloose than horizontal FDI. In order to promote a positive impact of vertical 
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FDI, host countries need to encourage wide cooperation between local stakeholders and 
Chinese investors to enhance their embeddedness in the local economy. Equally, a few 
results collectively suggest that India‟s FDI is more horizontal. Although we are not in a 
position to fully assess the exact impact of such FDI, what is certain is that horizontal 
FDI tends to be more integrated with the local economy.  
 
This study has contributed to our understanding of locational determinants of China‟s and 
India‟s FDI, but one should acknowledge some limitations. First, our results may suffer 
from small sample bias. Future work can add more countries from Africa and Western 
Europe to balance the sample composition. This will make the statistical analysis more 
robust and reliable. Secondly, as institutional environment is a complex concept to 
analyse, it is desirable to decompose this factor into different components to have a finer 
analysis of its impact on FDI decisions. Thirdly, our research has generated some rather 
unusual results, such as the impact of English speaking on India‟s FDI, and the impact of 
GDP growth. These indorse further empirical investigation with better data coverage.  
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Table 1 Chinese and Indian outward direct investment of 1981-2004, in US$ 
 
 YEAR 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
China FDI outflows .. 44 93 134 629 450 645 850 
 FDI outward stock 39.4 44 137 271 900 1350 1995 2845 
India FDI outflows 2 1 5 4 3 -1 5 11 
 FDI outward stock 80.1 81.071 86.07 90.07 93.07 92.071 97.071 108.07 
 
China 
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
FDI outflows 780 830 913 4000 4400 2000 2000 2114 
India 
FDI outward stock 3625 4455 5368 9368 13768 15768 17768 19882 
FDI outflows 10 6 -11 24 0.351 82 119 240 
FDI outward stock 118.07 124 113 293.9 294.2 376.2 495.2 735.24 
 YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
China FDI outflows 2562.5 2633.8 1774.3 915.78 6885.4 2518.41 -152.3 1805.05 
 FDI outward stock 22444 25078 26853 27768 34653.8 37172.2 37020 38825 
India FDI outflows 113 47 80 509 1397 1107 913 2222 
 FDI outward stock 564.41 705.78 1707.3 1858.5 2615.35 4005.35 5054.4 6592.35 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database 
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Table 2: Sample composition: country and year coverage 
 
Country  Chinese FDI Indian FDI 
Australia  1999-2002 2001-2004 
Austria  NA 2001-2004 
Brazil  1999-2002 NA 
Brunei  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Cambodia  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Canada  1999-2002 NA 
China  NA 2001-2004 
Egypt  1999-2002 NA 
Germany  1999-2002 NA 
Hong Kong  1999-2002 NA 
Indonesia  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Iran  NA 2001-2004 
Ireland  NA 2001-2004 
Italy  NA 2001-2004 
Japan  1989-2004 1989-2004 
Kazakhstan  1999-2002 2001-2004 
Laos  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Libya  NA 2001-2004 
Macao  1999-2002 NA 
Malaysia  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Mali  1999-2002 NA 
Malta  NA 2001-2004 
Mauritius  NA 2001-2004 
Mexico  1999-2002 NA 
Mongolia  1999-2002 NA 
Morocco  NA 2001-2004 
Myanmar  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Nepal  NA 2001-2004 
Netherlands  NA 2001-2004 
New Zealand  1999-2002 NA 
Nigeria  1999-2002 NA 
Oman  1999-2002 2001-2004 
Papua New Guinea  1999-2002 NA 
Peru  1999-2002 NA 
Philippines  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Russia  1999-2002 2001-2004 
Singapore  1995-2004 1995-2004 
South Africa  1999-2002 NA 
South Korea  1999-2002 NA 
Sri Lanka  NA 2001-2004 
Sudan  NA 2001-2004 
Tanzania  1999-2002 NA 
Thailand  1995-2004 1995-2004 
UK  NA 2001-2004 
United Arab Emirates  NA 2001-2004 
USA  1980-2005 1980-2005 
Vietnam  1995-2004 1995-2004 
Zambia  1999-2002 NA 
The number of observations for the unbalanced panel data 
is 226 and 222 for China and India, respectively. 
 31 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A:  
Chinese data 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
FDI 18.981 3.750 45.905 18.030 3.399 -129.00 355.60 
LNEXPORT 20.731 21.300 2.299 -0.771 -0.457 15.675 24.792 
LNIMPORT  20.907 21.200 2.452 0.140 -0.465 13.835 26.218 
LNDISTANCE 7.884 7.902 1.265 24.735 -4.249 0.000 9.262 
BUREAU 2.723 3.000 1.137 -0.894 -0.414 0.000 4.000 
CORRUPTION 3.126 3.000 1.345 -0.980 0.131 1.000 6.000 
POLRISK 72.079 72.000 12.344 -0.380 -0.462 41.000 95.000 
TAX RATE 0.306 0.308 0.079 1.829 -1.215 0.090 0.460 
INTEREST RATE 6.607 6.025 10.073 12.464 1.037 -41.680 70.740 
        
Panel B: 
Indian data 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
FDI 38.090 1.130 149.79 80.633 8.098 -17.600 1741.9 
LNEXPORT 18.526 19.636 3.333 0.136 -1.099 9.210 22.801 
LNIMPORT  19.366 19.921 2.323 0.174 -0.815 12.644 23.657 
LNDISTANCE 7.892 7.856 0.589 0.007 0.031 6.217 8.922 
BUREAU 2.855 3.000 1.065 -1.220 -0.357 1.000 4.000 
CORRUPTION 3.171 3.000 1.359 -1.122 -0.084 1.000 6.000 
POLRISK 73.576 76.000 13.329 -0.347 -0.622 36.000 97.000 
TAX RATE 0.298 0.300 0.092 1.600 -1.262 0.000 0.460 
INTEREST RATE 4.058 4.715 8.513 19.842 -3.249 -61.000 21.080 
        
Panel C: 
Host countries Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Kurtosis Skewness Minimum Maximum 
GDPPC 8.032 7.972 1.828 -1.462 -0.119 4.609 10.647 
GDPGW 4.253 4.300 3.626 3.223 -0.575 -13.10 13.800 
LNGDP 25.241 25.207 2.613 -0.965 0.192 20.625 30.153 
INFLATION 7.371 3.435 14.214 32.522 5.032 -4.000 128.40 
EXCHANGE 1514.5 25.525 3463.8 6.191 2.651 0.380 15704 
RESOURCE 5.889 1.345 12.551 11.496 3.331 0.000 73.450 
LNFDI-STOCK 21.046 23.155 5.985 0.449 -1.295 4.852 28.579 
MX/GDP 0.035 0.011 0.058 14.438 3.397 0.000 0.432 
FDI is the foreign direct investment made by China (or India) to host countries, in millions $US. LNEXPORT 
is the natural logarithm of the export from host country to China (or India). LNIMPORT is the natural 
logarithm of the import from host country to China (or India). LNDISTANCE is the natural logarithm of the 
geographical distance from the capital city of the host country to the capital of China (or India), in miles. 
BUREAU is the bureaucracy quality of the host country. CORRUPTION is the severity of corruption in the 
host country. POLRISK is the political risk in the host country. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita. GDPGW is the percentage GDP growth. LNGDP is the natural logarithm of GDP. INFLATION is the 
inflation rate. EXCHANGE is the exchange rate between $US and host country‟s currency. RESOURCE is 
the proportion of natural resource endowment. LNFDI-STOCK is the natural logarithm of foreign direct 
investment stock, net of home country FDI stock. TAX RATE is the corporate tax rate of the host country. 
INTEREST RATE is the annual interest rate of the host country. MX/GDP is the ratio of exports plus imports 
to the GDP of the host country. 
Table 4: Correlation matrix for the main variables 
Panel A: China FDI GDPGW LNGDP INFL EXCH RESRC LNEXP LNIMP LNDIS FDI-STK BUR CORR POL TAX 
GDPGW -0.060              
LNGDP 0.119 -0.180b             
INFLATION -0.130 0.057 -0.240a            
EXCHANGE -0.051 0.129 -0.166a 0.283a           
RESOURCE -0.077 -0.096 -0.356a 0.232a 0.000          
LNEXPORT 0.223a -0.099 0.825a -0.307a -0.082 -0.458a         
LNIMPORT 0.207a -0.042 0.799a -0.161b -0.025 -0.277a 0.844a        
LNDISTANCE -0.028 -0.158b 0.193a 0.051 -0.227a 0.170b -0.155b -0.164b       
LNFDI-STOCK 0.079 -0.011 0.458a -0.132 0.154b -0.529a 0.555a 0.513a -0.229a      
BUREAU -0.140b 0.278a -0.679a 0.436a 0.227a 0.252a -0.658a -0.596a -0.019 -0.426a     
CORRUPTION -0.153b 0.252a -0.306a 0.361a 0.285a -0.034 -0.262a -0.247a -0.201a 0.021 0.599a    
POLRISK -0.153b 0.209a -0.481a 0.498a 0.302a 0.119 -0.388a -0.347a -0.058 -0.182b 0.786a 0.740a   
TAX -0.112 -0.079 0.4366a 0.165b -0.036 -0.021 0.231a 0.163b 0.436a 0.183b 0.151b 0.228a 0.089  
INTEREST 0.041 -0.035 0.015 -0.498a -0.018 0.209a -0.024 -0.024 0.030 -0.231a -0.012 0.058 0.016 -0.155b 
               
Panel B: India FDI GDPGW LNGDP INFL EXCH RESRC LNEXP LNIMP LNDIS FDI-STK BURE CORR POL TAX 
GDPGW 0.038              
LNGDP 0.025 -0.198a             
INFLATION 0.067 0.094 -0.237a            
EXCHANGE -0.085 0.128 -0.139 0.178b           
RESOURCE 0.082 0.092 0.155b 0.021 -0.025          
LNEXPORT 0.022 0.039 0.745a -0.015 -0.135 0.173b         
LNIMPORT 0.079 -0.063 0.810a -0.194a -0.063 0.062 0.859a        
LNDISTANCE 0.094 -0.214a 0.378a -0.156b -0.155b 0.139 0.095 0.190b       
LNFDI-STOCK 0.058 -0.141b 0.772a -0.270a -0.101 0.207a 0.617a 0.659a 0.516a      
BUREAU 0.146b 0.365a -0.639a 0.370a 0.176b -0.079 -0.293a -0.348a -0.461a -0.687a     
CORRUPTION 0.063 0.314a -0.501a 0.311a 0.265a -0.116 -0.216a -0.288a -0.470a -0.542a 0.770a    
POLRISK 0.098 0.263a -0.516a 0.286a 0.156b -0.127 -0.139 -0.166b -0.465a -0.642a 0.852a 0.769a   
TAX -0.154b -0.177b 0.347a 0.163b 0.039 0.142 0.178b 0.136 0.148 0.183b 0.096 0.240a 0.077  
INTEREST -0.064 0.070 0.034 -0.585a 0.075 0.031 0.026 0.121 -0.027 -0.012 0.169b 0.184b 0.117 -0.202a 
(a) and (b) shows that the two-tailed Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. See notes to Table 3. 
   Table 5: Determinants of outward FDI: Chinese and Indian data pooled  
  
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LNGDP 55.120** 53.046** 62.989*** - - - 
 (27.550) (24.400) (23.550)    
GDPGW - - - -2.9211** -2.9604** -2.7849** 
    (1.4470) (1.4530) (1.3720) 
OPENNESS 5.4721* 6.0494* 262.943*** 255.463*** 228.391** 281.919*** 
 (3.2470) (3.5300) (98.510) (93.540) (106.700) (81.320) 
RESOURCE -0.5553 -0.3863 -2.4474 -2.6543 -2.3853 -1.9764 
 (1.1210) (1.0650) (1.6360) (1.7170) (1.7940) (1.4730) 
LNEXPORT -1.9473 -2.0893 -1.4626 2.0642 - - 
 (3.1790) (3.3060) (2.4500) (3.9620)   
LNIMPORT - - - - 10.2365* 8.2496* 
     (6.0670) (4.4520) 
EXCHANGE 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0014 0.0010 0.0031 
 (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
POLRISK 2.8072** - - 2.9146** 2.9962** 3.7136** 
 (1.3860)   (1.4190) (1.4440) (1.8431) 
BUREAU - 0.6721 - - - - 
  (5.3480)     
CORRUPTION - - 7.9415* - - - 
   (4.4500)    
LNDISTANCE -102.961* -105.025* -77.104* -72.831* -84.568** -63.587** 
 (56.650) (59.820) (43.190) (40.510) (40.980) (29.880) 
INFLATION -0.1224 - -0.1679 -0.4528* - - 
 (0.2494)  (0.3000) (0.2740)   
TAX RATE -0.7157** -0.5567** -1.0705*** -1.8290*** -1.6726*** -0.0799 
 (0.3572) (0.2635) (0.4122) (0.6769) (0.6195) (0.1914) 
INTEREST RATE - -0.1056 - - 0.1472 0.3512 
  (0.3386)   (0.2683) (0.2144) 
CHINA DUMMY 356.666*** 351.047*** 276.142** 269.181** 228.742** 657.538** 
 (119.300) (116.300) (113.600) (128.100) (109.200) (295.800) 
OECD DUMMY -250.864* -268.693* -109.608 -199.910** -196.788*** -112.211* 
 (147.000) (142.300) (133.400) (86.320) (72.410) (70.030) 
GDPGW x GROWTH DUMMY - - - 4.4250** 4.6401* 5.0424** 
    (2.1910) (2.5780) (2.1860) 
EXCHANGE x CHINA DUMMY -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0018) 
LNDISTANCE x CHINA DUMMY -45.064*** -44.211*** -38.434*** -39.048** -35.807** -86.843** 
 (14.720) (14.340) (14.940) (16.050) (15.950) (39.370) 
       
No. of observations 448 448 448 448 448 396 
R
2
/ Adjusted R
2
 0.358/0.259 0.351/0.252 0.359/0.260 0.345/0.243 0.346/0.244 0.392/0.283 
F statistics 270.6*** 59.24*** 268.5*** 217.4*** 1282*** 107.4*** 
See notes to Table 2 for variable definitions. CHINA DUMMY is 1 if the observation belongs to Chinese outward FDI; 0, otherwise. 
OECD DUMMY is 1 if the host country is a member of OECD; 0, otherwise The dependent variable is FDI. The estimated standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
OPENNESS is measured by LNFDI-STOCK in models 1, 2; and by MX/GDP in other models. GROWTH DUMMY is 1 if GDPGW is 
negative; 0, otherwise. In model 6, we dropped the US data. 
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 Table 6: Determinants of outward FDI: Chinese and Indian data decomposed 
  
 
China India 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LNGDP 57.814*** 34.319** - 32.483* -5.5567 - 
 (22.150) (16.910)  (19.101) (100.600)  
GDPGW - - -3.2876** - - -2.6299* 
   (1.4560)   (1.4460) 
OPENNESS 388.965* 188.913* 86.242 -170.841 -952.062 -1051.240 
 (223.200) (114.500) (243.500) (393.800) (684.400) (803.000) 
RESOURCE -0.5244 -0.7323 -0.3846 -0.6514 -0.2458 1.4496 
 (0.6129) (0.5101) (0.5794) (4.9580) (5.7710) (5.1150) 
LNEXPORT -18.9343 - - 3.7335 - - 
 (12.2000)   (11.4800)   
LNIMPORT - 0.5073 8.9670* - 29.2702* 30.654* 
  (7.9690) (5.1260)  (17.550) (16.980) 
EXCHANGE 0.0029** 0.0025** 0.0020** 0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0023 
 (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
POLRISK 1.9527** 2.0724** 1.9245** 1.5917 1.3406 1.3477 
 (0.9750) (1.0400) (0.9430) (2.0690) (2.1270) (2.4010) 
LNDISTANCE -5.4974*** -4.1362** -35.2733* 14.7270 54.078 44.913 
 (2.0060) (2.0520) (20.1500) (111.200) (106.800) (89.350) 
INFLATION 0.0892 0.0490 -0.0329 0.2371 0.2325 0.2079 
 (0.1376) (0.1125) (0.0810) (0.4629) (0.4364) (0.1760) 
TAX RATE -162.310** -98.067* -84.189* -664.946* -676.21* -635.574* 
 (66.500) (56.560) (48.250) (391.020) (397.01) (371.100) 
LANGUAGE DUMMY 42.674* 86.555** 90.430* -8.1041 47.9749 36.997 
 (25.104) (43.440) (54.490) (117.800) (152.100) (110.600) 
OECD DUMMY -171.394* -107.968* -70.150 -149.171 -90.0857 -137.378 
 (97.770) (62.970) (70.920) (813.000) (709.800) (308.400) 
GDPGW x GROWTH DUMMY - - 6.5789*** - - 2.4586* 
   (2.2850)   (1.4740) 
       
No. of observations 226 226 226 222 222 222 
R
2
/ Adjusted R
2 0.330/0.172 0.312/0.151 0.334/0.175 0.458/0.331 0.462/0.333 0.465/0.334 
F statistics 920.6*** 1976*** 2364*** 4550*** 8436*** 4583*** 
See notes to Tables 2 and 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is FDI. The estimated standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. OPENNESS is measured by MX/GDP in all models. LANGUAGE DUMMY is 1 if the official language of 
the host country is English; 0, otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
